THE New Republic

THE SILENT MODERATES OF THE SOUTH

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HOW TO MAKE A MILLION—ANNUALLY

By Warren Unna

Eisenhower—Constitutional Monarch?

By M. D. Feld

The Political Sense of Ford Madox Ford

By E. V. Walter

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BRITISH CARTOONISTS ON THE USA

MARCH 26, 1956

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

Washington Wire

Foreign aid fight

IKE SENT his big foreign aid bill up to Congress this week with a lot of pious words. But he won't get the money from Congress without a fight. This could be a historic show-down on whether the US really means to match Communism in the economic cold war. There is nothing in the Eisenhower record to indicate that he will make the necessary battle.

Ike has enough popularity to sacrifice some of it in a good scrap with Congress. A Gallup Poll approval of 55 percent, say, plus the $5 billion foreign aid program would be better for the country than 75 percent approving Ike and only half that aid. But that is not like Ike. He recommends and withdraws. His Foreign Operations Administrator is John B. Hollister who rather dislikes foreign aid. Last year in the showdown on the tariff battle Ike beat a hasty retreat on the terms of the 3-year extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act rather than face a Senate bloc which he could certainly have defeated. Democrats had fought his bill through for him in the House, but he submitted to the oil interests in the Senate. Maybe this time Ike will fight.

In a way the new foreign aid bill is symbolic. It tests the professions of leadership against the Communist challenge. Who are the real opponents of Communists in America today? Are they the conservatives who won't pay the cost of the economic cold war? The leadership here should come from Ike, but the prospect is that he will speak and then sit back. That, alas, explains part of his popularity. At a time of prosperity Ike doesn't rock the boat. But the cold war is not going our way, and at home our planning is not keeping pace with our population.

Immobilized leadership

IKE TEMPORIZED with schools, health, the Bricker Amendment, with lower tariffs and the current farm bill. Think what a man like Ike could do now on television with an appeal for calmness and forward-movement in race relations. But Ike says it's up to Congress to set up a commission "with subpoena power." (Heaven knows why such an emotional job as this needs subpoena power; as soon try to conciliate the Westinghouse strike by subpoenaing the antagonists.)

After 20 years of drift of this sort FDR came along and averted a real revolution by instituting a social revolution. He pulled it off just in time. But the people who denounced FDR now back harmonious Ike.

America has been greatest when it had strong Presidents. The frightening thing about four more years of Ike is that his tendency to drift and withdraw might well increase. He would be 70 at the end of another term. Dr. Paul S. White diagnosed the fundamental disease back of Ike's heart attack as arteriosclerosis. This is a progressive condition, increasing with age, and slowing down the patient. It does not make for energetic leadership. Yet immobilism for a nation could be more dangerous than an embolism.

Missing the bus

WE CAN'T remember a time when a party to a dispute played so completely into the hands of opponents as have the white leaders of Montgomery, Alabama, to the Negroes boycotting segregated buses. A Negro woman was arrested when she wouldn't budge in a bus. Some friends proposed a one-day boycott. It was all as simple as that and would probably never have been heard of again if the *Montgomery Advertiser* hadn't grabbed it and given it front-page scare treatment. The Chief of Police contributed his bit by going on the air to promise protection for all Negroes riding buses. More free publicity. As though this weren't enough, every bus was tailed by a noisy motorcycle cop. That alone kept off every neutral Negro—just to stay clear of trouble. Next the haughty bus line slapped the whole Negro community by withdrawing buses from their neighborhoods. It discovered this was a dreadful blunder, but by the time buses were restored passive resistance was on for keeps. Finally the jittery white community started mass arrests—95 Negro leaders—including 25 clergy.

That's the way to win support, arrest the priests! The British are having great luck with it in Cyprus where at least they have the excuse of violence. In Montgomery the danger is that the white leaders will now try something desperate, to save face. They can't bear to think of themselves as a laughing stock to their inferiors.

Adlai's campaign

HOWEVER the primaries go, we can't help loving Adlai. No doubt about it, his witticisms have *èlan*. He dumbfounded a Detroit audience by quoting excerpts from the two leading Republican newspapers, the *News* and the *Free Press*, containing such heretical comments as "The President's health is *not* a private matter," and suggesting editorially that his physical condition made it "time for a change." With the audience still gasping he explained that the editorials were written in 1944—when it was permissible to discuss a Democrat's health. Then at Kasson, Minn., famous for the speech where Candidate Eisenhower pledged "not 90 percent parity . . . full parity," Adlai noted regretfully the difference between Ike's promise and performance. He suggested that a plaque be set up to mark the spot with the inscription, "General Eisenhower Slipped Here."

Notes . . .

THE CONTRETEMPS over Nixon has had one big political effect. It has made him the hero of that Old Guard; he is their boy and he becomes a symbol for them (and an insurance policy) in the Executive. . . . In four years Ike has not created a new Republican party; the professionals still look upon Ike as an irregular with Nixon as their ambassador in his ranks. . . . Doug (Give-away) McKay's hasty departure from the Cabinet has caused comment; theoretically he went to unseat Senator Wayne Morse (D, Ore.), but it turns out the Oregon GOP didn't know he was coming; another GOP contestant, Hitchcock, won't withdraw.

T.R.B

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The New Republic

A JOURNAL OF OPINION

March 26, 1956

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Correspondence

► ***Graham Greene Clarifies***

SIRS:

Certainly I would say that Fowler, the main character in *The Quiet American* (reviewed by John Lehmann, *NR*, March 12), disliked American policy in the Far East—so, I admit, does the author. But anyone who reads the book with care will notice the attitude of Fowler to Pyle is not that of an enemy. Otherwise there would be no tragedy in the story and the last sentence would be meaningless. I would point out two phrases to you: the last sentence on page 19 of the American edition "Am I the only one who really cared for Pyle?" The other phrase is one which I can't lay my fingers on but runs roughly—"I felt betrayed, but one is not betrayed by an enemy."

It is always a fatal thing to use the

(*Continued on page 23*)

The Silent Moderates

IT IS a felony to advocate desegregation today in Georgia; school boards there and in other Southern states may be punished for sanctioning desegregation; teachers who conduct mixed classes lose their licenses "forever." But the impulse to control free speech, which follows the intent to perpetuate segregation, cannot stop here. The Mississippi legislature has adopted, with two dissenting votes, an act which makes it unlawful, on pain of a $1,000 fine and six months in prison, "to solicit, advocate, urge or encourage disobedience to any laws of the state of Mississippi: and non-conformance with the state of Mississippi." A further measure, House Bill 34, broadens the state's control of slander and defamation. The *Delta Democrat Times* describes it as "a club which any drunk, burglar, reckless driver, irresponsible politician or shyster lawyer in the state could hold over each newspaper and any individual citizen who is used to speaking his mind." Similarly, in Atlanta, the administration of Governor Marvin Griffin has induced the Georgia legislature to pass a bill that subjects the state's major newspapers to suit in any county. "The punitive intent of the measure is obvious," comments *The Atlanta Constitution*. . . . It seeks to harass, to hamstring and to intimidate. . . . "

Where state governments stop short, leaders within the white community are moving on their own to silence dissent. Five Southern clergymen who counselled understanding have been driven from their pulpits in Mississippi, Georgia and South Carolina. Many more educators have been driven from the state universities since Chester Travelstead, Dean of the School of Education of the University of South Carolina, first lost his job for advocating acceptance of the Supreme Court's view. Those who take their cue from President Eisenhower may suppose that the struggle is between extremists and that if whites are punished it is because they voice extremist views. But, begging the President's pardon, there are no extremists on integration in the South. It is the moderates who are being labelled "extremist" and punished because they plead for moderation. The current attack upon Dr. Guy Wells of Carroll County, Georgia, is a case in point.

"The reason they're so hot on me," Dr. Wells explains, "is that I'm a native; I've taught their boys and girls for forty years." Wells started teaching in one-room rural schools. He moved on to be principal of the schools of Lumpkin, Richland, Donaldson and Eastman in Georgia. For nine years he was President of the Georgia State College for Women at Milledgeville. He was the organizing president of the Georgia Association of School Administrators.

In 1948 Wells spent a year in Germany as educational adviser to General Lucius Clay. Again, in 1953, he was sent to Libya as educational consultant under the Point Four program. There he gauged the damage

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done to the United States by color prejudice. So he joined the Georgia Committee on Interracial Co-operation.

THE Supreme Court was reaching its decision as Dr. Wells went to work. During two years of rising tensions he toured the state passing on one thought to Rotary lunches and church groups: that the problem was to keep open the lines of communication between white and colored Georgians. By meeting together and talking over their problems, he maintained the two races could reach agreement on the necessity of order and the pace of change. "If ever there was a traitor to the white people of Georgia," concluded Roy Harris in his paper, the *Augusta Courier,* "it is Guy Wells."

On February 13, 1956, Dr. Wells addressed a small gathering at Paine College in Augusta. It was attended, to quote the *Courier,* "by about a dozen renegade whites and 25 Negroes." Wells delivered his customary talk on The Marks of an Educated Man. An educated man, he declared, was one who has an adequate use of the mother tongue; who understands the history and traditions of his country and something of the world; who can cross national and racial boundaries (since two-thirds of the world's citizens are colored); who works out an adequate philosophy (which includes a sense of humor) and who has put his philosophy into practice. In illustrating what he meant, Dr. Wells told a few rather ancient jokes.

On March 12 a highly distorted version of the meeting was published in the *Augusta Courier.* At once Governor Griffin moved to make an example of Wells. By paying $450 a year into a teachers' retirement fund Wells had accumulated pension rights of $518.93 a month. And since he is President Emeritus of the Georgia State College for Women he owns a life and hospitalization insurance policy. These Griffin is endeavoring to take away. "To be drawing $518.93 a month pension," said Griffin, "Dr. Wells has been acting a little ugly."

On March 15 the state Board of Education instructed the state Teachers Retirement Board to discontinue "if possible" the pension drawn by Wells. On the same day the state Board of Regents erased the title of President Emeritus in order to nullify Wells' life and hospitalization insurance. Both bodies acted on the story published by the *Courier;* neither granted to Wells even the opportunity to be heard.

"I have nothing to retract or apologize for," answered Wells. . . .

> I think that what happens to Guy Wells, his titles or his earned state teachers' retirement is not the important thing, not segregation nor integration which all good men know will come in time—but freedom of speech and thought is the fundamental issue. If this attack upon me will help keep those rights for Georgians, the sacrifice will not be too great a price.

For the moment, however, Georgians seem less concerned with their rights than with their fears. Wells is a former district governor of Rotary; nothing has been heard from its leaders. He is an active Baptist, praised by Dr. Louie Newton as "one of Georgia's first citizens of this generation" who "is serving his day and generation by the will of God." The Baptists have yet to come to his defense. Wells is a past president of the Georgia Teachers Association, and the Association was meeting in state convention as he began his fight. But although Griffin's action undermined the right of every teacher in Georgia to a pension, the Association remained silent; it resolved instead to continue the fight against the Supreme Court.

The Atlanta Journal and *The Constitution* have cried loudly that their own freedom to speak is threatened by Governor Griffin. In brief editorials both papers agreed that the Wells case "makes one wonder if it is really safe to speak and think independently in America today." In the same editorials both newspapers disavowed the views of Dr. Wells. *The Constitution,* whose editor, Ralph McGill, holds a national reputation as a moderate, was quick to repudiate "the philosophy which Dr. Wells now espouses" and rested its complaint on "fair play."

A YOUNG editor in Gainesville ran a furious editorial berating Governor Griffin; a group of alumnae of Georgia State wired: "You are still President Emeritus to us"; the Southern Regional Council stands behind him; a vase of roses, sent by the Negro Teachers Association, brightens his desk. But if Dr. Wells is to be disavowed as an extremist by representative Southerners, what then is the meaning of moderation, and how will the lines of communication, be kept open in the South?

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Middle-East Peace?

THE UN Security Council will devote its next meeting about April 1 to the Arab-Israeli war threat, and the US is preparing a package of proposals which constitute a major Western response to the Russian arming of Egypt.

Details are being ironed out with Britain and France. The package will include a proposal that a UN political unit should again undertake to mediate Arab-Israeli differences. The UN Truce Supervisory Group now representing the Security Council in Israel is limited to enforcing the cease-fire agreement of 1949; and the UN Palestine Conciliation Group, set up in 1949 to work for a political settlement, has been dormant for six years. The new proposal would revive the UN political effort.

Another proposal is a UN embargo on shipment of arms into the Arab-Israeli area. If this proposal is unacceptable to the Security Council, the US will probably announce bilateral granting of defensive arms to Israel, particularly fighter planes and anti-tank guns sufficient to blunt an Arab attack.

The package will also include enlarging the military observer staff of the UN truce team in Israel and broadening its functions to make border sorties more difficult.

Shifting negotiations to the UN is a tacit admission that private talks conducted by the US and Britain since last August were unsuccessful. It also acknowledges that the talks must now include the Russians, and the Security Council is the most unobtrusive way to bring them in.

In preliminary talks Britain has advocated that the Security Council itself conduct the mediation, using a one-man mediator of the Count Bernadotte-Ralph Bunche type as the Council's agent. Bunche himself has been proposed. The French have also advocated US-USSR talks in advance of the Council meeting to sound out the Russians on an arms embargo.

Whatever the device for negotiations, the basic problems confronting the mediators remain the same as those outlined by Secretary of State Dulles in his constructive Middle East peace proposals last August 26—that is, resettlement of refugees, adjustment of Arab-Israeli borders, a vast scheme of land and water development, and a security guarantee against attack. Except for the recent substantial agreement on division of the Jordan waters, American officials are frank in reporting no progress on Mr. Dulles' four points.

"Work and Play"

AT mid-March Mr. Eisenhower had held the office of President 1151 days and had been away from the White House 517 days, roughly half the time. A check of White House records shows most of these absences described as "work-and-play" vacations.

Mr. Eisenhower's longest "work and play" period was 56 days in Colorado in the summer and fall of 1954. Next longest was for 43 days in Colorado in the fall of 1953. Last year he had been in Colorado 40 days before he was stricken, and he thereafter spent 50 days in the Denver hospital, 37 days at Gettysburg, and 10 days in Key West.

Before his illness the President vacationed at a Georgia golf course 44 days on four different trips averaging 11 days each. Three brief business trips abroad took him to Ottawa, to Bermuda and to Geneva.

The President's friends have said that his critics are unfair in calling him a half-time President; the problems of the chief executive, after all, are always with him.

Stalin's Former Friends

THIRTY delegates are said to have fainted when Khrushchev told the Twentieth Party Congress on February 24 that Stalin was a brutal and cowardly bungler, who had lied, tortured, destroyed the best brains of the Red Army and fled Moscow at its hour of greatest need. The same Khrushchev had told the 18th Party Congress that Stalin was "the towering genius of all humanity, the teacher and guide who is leading us victoriously to Communism." All Russians, including the Georgians who rioted on hearing the news, were invited in effect to conclude that Stalin's cause was as treacherous as the man who led it and that if Khrushchev and his associates had lied once, they would lie again.

Why then did Khrushchev speak? Stalin had been restored to favor at the preliminary party conferences held in each Republic. And while Mikoyan had criticized Stalin by name in the Moscow meeting, Khrushchev had followed a middle line. His Stalin speech apparently was decided upon half way through the conference. Either a hard core of Stalinist opposition emerged and had to be dispersed or, more probably, the 1,600 delegates proved more obtuse than Khrushchev had expected and required shock treatment in order to break with the encumbrances of the past.

Stalin, Khrushchev confirms, was a dangerous paranoid who, to justify himself, filled his nation with obsessive fears. Today, that national paranoia prevents the closer relationship that the collective leadership desires between the regime and the people and between the Soviet state and the outside world. Paths were opened by Stalin's heirs that led to future successes; at each opening stood the ghostly figure of Stalin, barring the way.

In all history no man had a greater opportunity than Stalin to fasten upon the future his chosen myth of himself. Three years after his death the myth is undone by his henchmen. This seems to us gratifying.

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"The Daily Worker"

EVER since the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, the American Communist movement has given the impression of a man in shock.

This was true even before the reports began to filter out of Russia of Nikita S. Khrushchev's sensational denunciation of Stalin as a phobia-ridden murderer.

Thus Alan Max, the *Daily Worker's* leading political commentator, writes that the Congress "jolted" him and other "American Marxists." He goes on to ask resentfully where were Khrushchev, Mikoyan, *et al* "when they say that collective leadership was lacking—what about their own mistakes in that period of capitalist encirclement?"

Max now acknowledges that Communists "went overboard" defending Stalin's infallibility, the lack of civil liberties in the Soviet Union and its cultural authoritarianism. Many errors could have been avoided, he says wistfully, "if we Marxists had stood more firmly on our own feet in these matters."

The *Worker* Foreign Editor, Joseph Clark, echoes this resentment. Noting that German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht has said that Stalin's works are no longer to be considered Marxist "classics," he comments, "Ulbricht would have been a lot more candid if he had only admitted that he himself contributed to sponsoring the 'cult of the individuals'."

Such public attacks on the leaders of international Communism and questioning of basic policies are unprecedented. Even in the hectic first days of the Nazi-Soviet pact, there was no criticism of Moscow by Communist apologists in other countries, only some thrashing about until Moscow's new line became clear.

The reaction of the American Communist movement to the 20th Congress is noteworthy not because it will have any significant political influence here, but because it is symptomatic of what may be happening in Communist ranks all over the world, including the Soviet Union.

Soviet leaders may get away with downgrading Stalin without a major internal upheaval, but it is difficult to see how the Communist movement abroad can now avoid a major moral and intellectual crisis. Communists have lost their jobs, suffered public ostracism, gone to prison, given up their lives defending policies that are now branded by Moscow not only as mistaken but also, apparently, as products of a megalomaniac.

Khrushchev can plead that he and his colleagues had to put up with Stalin's fantastic cruelties and vanities because they all lived in terror of their lives. But no such defense is possible for the leaders of Communism abroad. Ring Lardner, Jr., one of the Hollywood Ten, in a letter in the *Sunday Worker* of March 18, asks in connection with the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute "On whom did the obligation of objective criticism rest more squarely than on a party detached by distance and immediate interest from the smoke of that battle?"

Lardner was objecting to the suggestion that the revaluation of Stalin was primarily a problem for the Soviet Communist Party. "Much more urgent for American Marxists," wrote Lardner, "is the obligation to face up to their own participation in, and lack of critical attitude toward, those errors."

It will be surprising indeed if the rank and file does not insist upon a ruthless confrontation of where the Communist movement went wrong — organizationally, philosophically and morally.

This agonizing reappraisal, if not thwarted, will take place under harrowing conditions. The line is not settled in Moscow. The speeches at the 20th Party Congress betrayed subtle clashes in emphasis on such matters as the parliamentary path to socialism. There may be, therefore, no safety in echoing Moscow.

Moreover the trend in Moscow, if it means what it says, means that Moscow wants Communist writers and thinkers within limits to show self-reliance, creativity, freshness of thought and expression and Communist parties to find their own paths to socialism.

This would seem to fit in neatly with the wish of Alan Max that "American Marxists" stand more firmly on their own feet. However, this will not be easy in a movement which for decades reserved its most drastic penalties for spontaneity and independence, a movement which, indeed, gave its enemies in the US lessons in identifying dissent with disloyalty and treachery.

BUT perhaps the greatest obstacle to the American Communists' coming to terms with their past is that a reappraisal would be an indictment of much of the existing international Communist leadership. This may explain why an article by William Z. Foster on "The Revaluation of Stalin's Work" strikes a far different note from that of Alan Max. Foster repeats the old rationalizations of Stalinism—that capitalist encirclement, the difficulties of industrialization and collectivization, "required imperatively a high degree of centralization and a strong discipline."

He still had to be shown, Foster wrote, "what, if any, decisive political mistakes were made by Stalin" and what "alternatives" they were. "Were injustices committed during the purges?" Foster asked a few hours before the stories began to come out about Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin as a murderer and a coward.

Foster's article indicates the powerful pressures in the Communist ranks to subordinate any moral and intellectual reexamination to opportunist political purposes—such as protecting the present leadership and ending the Party's isolation.

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That $2,500 Contribution—III

How To Make a Million—Annually

by WARREN UNNA

HOWARD B. KECK, whose $2,500 was offered for the political campaign of Sen. Francis Case (R, S.D.), heads an oil and gas firm which paid the government no income taxes at all last year and took credit for the preceding two years. But Keck's Superior Oil Company of California is just one of 27 natural gas producers cited for high net income and low or non-existent taxes by Sen. Paul H. Douglas (D, Ill.) during his fight against passage of a Senate amendment to the Natural Gas Act.

Senator Douglas, using an alphabetical listing, showed that Superior Oil actually claimed a $100,000 tax credit from the government in 1954 while seven other companies paid no taxes and called it even. Overall, the group of 27 averaged 5.85 percent taxes on their net income. This compares with the 52-percent maximum taxes exacted from other types of business. Keck and his fellow producers had obviously taken full advantage of the special provisions inserted into the Internal Revenue Act for gas, oil and other mineral concerns.

In a way, it's one happy circle. The gas producers have a wad of greenbacks in hand to contribute to worthy politicos because the law, which the politicos enacted, frees them from steep income taxes. Or, one might say, the law is there because of the money, and the money is there because of the law. And with a House Ways and Means Committee and a Senate Finance Committee each stacked with enough gas and oil-friendly conservatives to insure a gas and oilman peaceful nights, there is scant chance the happy circle will be broken.

For many years now, there has been a 27.5-percent deduction allowed from gross income for "depletion"—defended as an incentive for getting America's mineral deposits developed. The theory behind it is that gas—or other minerals—once removed from the earth and sold are not going to be replaced for future income.

In more recent times, gas and oilmen have also been permitted to write off "intangible drilling expenses" as money invested in the business. In this way they, as distinct from other types of businessmen, can charge their capital improvements against current business income.

Wealthy men have also felt encouraged purposely to invest and build up auxiliary enterprises which take momentary losses. This is done because the law allows them to write off their losses in these companies against their gains from gas and oil—and enter a lower tax bracket.

Until recently, the law declared that if more than $50,000 a year was written off in losses of one business against another for five consecutive years, the whole income was subject to being reopened, the listed losses given a closer scrutiny and those over $50,000 disallowed.

But under Section 270(b) of the 1954 Income Tax

WARREN UNNA *is a reporter for* The Washington Post and Times Herald.

Shortchanging the Government

IN ADDITION to Superior Oil Co., seven other gas and oil firms paid no federal income taxes at all during 1954, according to Senator Douglas' study of their latest annual reports:

Bishop Oil Co., with a net income of $309,405; Chicago Corp., $5,320,750; Drilling & Exploration Co., $785,624; Southern Production Co., $4,173,767; Texas Gulf Producing Co., $5,245,527; Western Natural Gas Co., $1,262,177; and Wilcox Oil Co., $647,516.

OTHER FIRMS included in Senator Douglas' alphabetical study are:

Reserve Oil & Gas Co., which had an after-tax income of $539,708 in 1954 and paid $2,500 in federal income taxes; Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, $2,304,377 and $31,180; Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp., $3,235,561 and $38,112; Middle States Petroleum Corp., $2,163,707 and $42,130; General American Oil Co. of Texas, $7,677,671 and $429,075.

Seaboard Oil Co., $7,470,307 (after tax income) and $335,000 (fed. income tax); Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., $7,856,034 and $400,000; Republic Natural Gas Co., $4,064,521 and $220,000; Amerada Petroleum Corp., $19,777,648 and $1,252,000; Argo Oil Corp., $4,288,870 and $336,889; Mission Corp., $5,739,385 and $470,000.

Honolulu Oil Corp., $10,263,310 (after tax income) and $1,278,154 (fed. income tax); General Crude Oil Co., $3,210,162 and $360,000; Franco-Wyoming Oil Co., $2,038,086 and $238,329; Pacific Western Oil Corp., $12,517,813 and $1,967,000; Humble Oil & Refining Co., $146,303,000 and $28,500,000; Houston Oil Co. of Texas, $6,487,785 and $1,275,000; Continental Oil Co., $41,683,000 and $8,700,000; and Plymouth Oil Co., $6,759,061 and $1,636,500.

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Law a new provision was inserted—reportedly at the behest of the gas and oil lobby—permitting unlimited "intangible drilling" expenses for the gas and oilman:

"I believe," Senator Douglas said during the gas bill debate, "the figures of how little taxes are paid by some of the major gas producing companies will show just how well off they already are."

Keck's Superior Oil Company of California reported a net income (after taxes) of $3,395,446 for the year ending last August 31 and paid no federal income taxes at all. In 1954, the firm reported a net income of $10,360,388 and took a tax credit, which appeared to be a refund from the government, of $100,000. In 1953, the net income reported was $12,000,382 and the credit claimed, $500,000. With its net income reported in the millions during the past 15 years, Superior paid no federal income taxes again in 1941 and 1946 and taxes of from $100,000 to $400,000 for all but 1951, when the payment was $1.9 million.

Superior deducted $7,542,225 for "depreciation and development" last year; $6,577,390 in 1954; and amounts varying from $4 million to almost $6 million between 1949 and 1953.

Superior deducted $35,275,383 for "intangible development costs" last year; $26,674,519 in 1954; and $23,169,921 in 1953. Between 1947 and 1952, the deduction varied from almost $12.5 million to almost $20 million. Between 1940 and 1946, it varied from $2 million to $7.5 million.

Some gas and oil properties are not listed, such as those privately owned by H. L. Hunt, of Dallas, rumored to have an income of $200,000 a day, or, on an annual basis, a grand total of $73 million. Taking a gas and oil magnate of more modest means than Hunt, say one with an annual income of only $60 million, here is how the Internal Revenue Act provisions might apply:

► He can deduct up to half of his net income under the 27.5-percent "depletion" clause—that cuts the reportable income down to $30 million right away.

► He can deduct $49,999 as losses from other businesses—bringing the reportable income down to $29,950,001.

► He can deduct, under Section 270(b) of the 1954 law, an unlimited amount for his "intangible drilling" expenses in exploratory wells—bringing his reportable income down to zero.

Income taxes are thus totally avoided. The government only cuts in with gift taxes which the gas and oilman might make to his relatives, and estate taxes on his death. Both gift and estate taxes are far lower than the 91-percent maximum federal personal-income-tax rate.

And if the gas and oilman was provident enough to have obtained tax-exempt state, municipal or United States Savings Bonds before their issue ceased in 1941—his heirs can enjoy an untaxable 3 to 4 percent on that investment.

What Superior Oil's Keck reported was strictly his business, and that of the Internal Revenue Service. But after reviewing the special gas and oil provisions in the Internal Revenue Act, there seems little reason to worry that for a good many years now Mr. Keck has been well able to "fish up" $2,500 or so for the campaigns of right-thinking politicos.

Eisenhower: Constitutional Monarch?

by M. D. FELD

"It is fair to assume," Frederic W. Collins suggested in his *New Republic* article last week, "that when [Eisenhower] leaves it, the Presidency will be something other than what it was when he took it."

I would like to suggest that the American Presidency, tailored to fit Eisenhower's style, is coming to resemble more and more closely the British model of cabinet government and constitutional monarchy.

There have been many ardent American admirers of the British method of governing. Thus, in his *Memoirs*, Harry S. Truman relates that

> Secretary of Defense Forrestal for some time had been advocating our using the British cabinet system as a model in the operation of government. There is much to this idea—in some ways a cabinet government is more efficient—but under the British system there is group responsibility of the cabinet. Under our system the responsibility rests on one man—the President.

The nature of that responsibility, as Mr. Collins wrote, has undergone considerable change since Mr. Eisenhower's tenure in the White House.

Commenting in *Newsweek* of January 23, one of the President's supporters suggested that a major reason for Eisenhower's election in 1952 was that most Americans "wanted a President who would stand above petty partisanship, who would be a President of all the people. In Mr. Eisenhower they saw the man."

The appeal of a single commanding figure who rises above political bickering, who, in fact does not command

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too much, has its counterpart in Walter Bagehot's classic description of constitutional monarchy:

> The nation is divided into parties, but the crown is of no party. Its apparent separation from business is that which removes it both from enemies and from desecration, which preserves its mystery, which enables it to combine the affection of conflicting parties—to be a visible symbol of unity to those still so imperfectly educated as to need a symbol.

Bagehot's monarch was not envisioned merely as a decorative figurehead. He was, rather, a guarantor of moderation and good sense, a brake on demagoguery, one whose very impersonality would serve as a rein on "arrogant" private interests; and finally, he was seen as an ultimate consultant, providing steadiness and breadth to ministers who had been selected on the basis of more narrow expertise. He would have, therefore, not only duties but definite rights as well. Or, "to state the matter shortly," said Bagehot:

> the sovereign has, under a constitutional monarchy such as ours, three rights—the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn. And a kind of great sense and sagacity would want no others. We would find that his having no others would enable him to use these with singular effect. He would say to his ministers: "The responsibility of these measures is upon you. Whatever you think best must be done. Whatever you think best shall have my full and effectual support. But you will observe that for this reason and that reason what you propose to do is bad; for this reason and that reason what you do not propose is better. I do not oppose, it is my duty not to oppose, but observe that I warn."

A strong or near-autonomous cabinet was not unknown in the United States before this administration, but almost always it occurred during administrations of nonentities such as Pierce or Buchanan in the White House. What is unique in the present situation is that Mr. Eisenhower, commanding infinitely more popularity and political strength than any other figure in political life, chooses deliberately to avoid the direct exercise of that influence.

Shortly after the President took office, *Fortune* magazine, in an adulatory article on the "new model" executive branch, declared that

> Eisenhower practices decentralization and delegation of authority. Between him and the heads of government departments and agencies is a definite understanding established forthrightly in advance: You have full authority. I expect you to stand on your own feet. Whatever you decide goes. The White House will stay out of your hair.

Or as Secretary Humphrey puts it: "The President is always quick to jump in with a suggestion. He almost never jumps in with a decision."

"You must understand," another of President Eisenhower's "closest advisers" has been quoted as saying,

> that Eisenhower is a new kind of President using new methods. He does not intend to satisfy the people on the extreme edge of any given controversy. He is trying above everything else to create a community of interest, a community of mind, within the Republican Party. It is by no means certain that the method will work. But the President is determined to give it a try.

This policy, of course, *has* been tried and is the basic tenet of constitutional monarchy. Olympian heights can only be attained if the Executive shields himself from day-to-day decisions with a responsible and autonomous cabinet and a staff which is instructed to prepare for his approval "agreed" positions rather than alternate choices as has been noted in another, but not unrelated, governmental context (by Bagehot): "In most cases the greatest wisdom of a constitutional king would show itself in well-considered inaction."

IT WAS the prolonged insanity of George III and the dissolute irresponsibility of his children that provided the extra-legal stimuli which enabled full-fledged cabinet government to come into being in England. The Eisenhower Cabinet of today can be regarded as an instrument improvised to meet another and surely less severe kind of emergency, a President not only reluctant to lead—but now under instructions to avoid too strenuous activity.

This transformation of the nature of the American Executive contains within it two apparently contradictory and yet consistent trends: the image of the great conciliator in the White House becomes more impressive and persuasive, yet the office of the Presidency itself becomes less influential in the controversial, day-to-day assertion of policy. The contrast between what is happening and what used to happen was well described in a *US News and World Report* story (December 31, 1954) quoting a supporter of the "new model" executive:

> President Roosevelt tried to master every problem himself and keep his hand always at the controls. President Truman struggled hard to keep himself abreast of the current of events that swept through and over to the White House. President Eisenhower has a staff of experts, ready to tackle any new problem that rises above the surface. . . . For the first time in history, the White House is becoming a self-operating institution—more of an institution than a man.

It is reasonable to assume that given the condition of Eisenhower's health, a second term will require even further administrative adjustments, further reliance on Cabinet and staff, further personal disengagement by the President from responsibilities assumed by past Presidents.

Our Executive structure, in this way, might come to take on an even more striking resemblance to constitutional monarchy.

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The U.S.— Seen From Britain

These are comments, some bitter, some sweet, which British cartoonists have made since the first of this year on American politics, the visit of Anthony Eden to Washington, and on the present state of Anglo-American relations. They are taken from a variety of publications, reflecting many shades of political thought.



Punch, January 18, 1956

And it came to pass, when Eisenhower held up his hand, the Republicans prevailed; and when he let down his hand, the Democrats prevailed.

["And it came to pass, when Moses held up his hand, that Israel prevailed: and when he let down his hand, Amalek prevailed. But Moses' hands were heavy; and they took a stone and put it under him, and he sat thereupon; and Aaron and Hur stayed up his hands, the one on the one side, and the other on the other side; and his hands were steady until the going down of the sun." *Exodus, XVIII*]

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Vicky in the *Daily Mirror*, January 30, 1956

"Now, make yourself comfortable, Anthony, and let's start talking. . . ."

L. G. in *Punch*, February 1, 1956

EDEN (suddenly, after a long pause): "Darling!"
EISENHOWER: "Yes, Darling?"
EDEN: "Nothing, Darling. Only Darling, Darling!"



Cummings in the *Daily Express*, January 23, 1956

"Sir Anthony, I presume."
"Mr. Dulles, I presume."

BUS STOP
TOWN CENTRE via JAILHOUSE HOSPITAL CEMET
COLOURED PEOPLE
WHITE FOLKS ONLY
"Can't you make 'em use the bus? Ain't there a law to let us break their legs?"
LOW'S GUIDE TO THE WORLD:-
ALABAMA, U.S.A

Low in the *Manchester Guardian*, February 28, 1956

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Vicky in *The New Statesman and Nation*, February 18, 1956

"Oh no, not that! We surrender!"



Vicky in the *Daily Mirror*, March 2, 1956

"Gee, Ike, you've made me the happiest girl in the world— er—now, what do we do about little Dick over there?"



Senator Eden (representing England State) leaves to take his place in Congress.

Grenadier Guards fall into line with U.S. Army practice. . .

Yankee "know-how" solves the London traffic problem . . .

Californian P.R.O.s come over to remove that "stuffed-shirt" attitude of British Ministers . . .

Improvements come to Printing House Square . . .



The senator for the State of France takes his seat in Congress.

American hygiene removes some of the beauty spots of Paris . . .

Transatlantic cuisine invades the Tour d'Argent Restaurant . . .

Above all, the German Navy becomes offensive to no one.

Cummings in the *Daily Express*, January 19, 1956

Let's Try Union with U.S.A.—Just to End Those Dulles vs. Europe Bickerings.

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The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy—III

The Frustrations of Foreign Aid

by HANS MORGENTHAU

THE IMMATURITY of our foreign-aid policy is strikingly illustrated by the way in which the current debate concerning it is carried on. The principal point at issue is the amount of money to be spent, not the substance of the policy to be pursued. Both camps assume that one can, as it were, buy the objectives of foreign aid through the outlay of a certain amount of money; the more money one spends, the more objectives one is going to buy; and the only point of difference is how many objectives one needs and can afford to buy.

This monetary conception of foreign aid has dominated our policy since the days of the Marshall Plan. Yet it has been mistaken from the beginning, and many of the frustrations and futilities of our foreign-aid policy can be attributed to this misplaced emphasis.

For the objectives of economic or technical aid are not economic or technical *per se* but political and social, and these objectives have to be attained through the intermediary of a foreign government which may or may not be willing and able to attain them. This twofold complication of the problem of foreign aid was obscured by the stark urgency with which the economic decay of Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II posed the problem for American policy. The problem was further obscured by the spectacular success which American policy achieved, measured by the requirements of the immediate emergency.

The Marshall Plan restored the productivity of Western Europe and advanced it to record heights. However, the Marshall Plan sought to restore not only the economic but also the social and political health of Western Europe. Communism has not been able to take over Western Europe, and the Marshall Plan deserves part of the credit for that victory. Yet Communism is far from defeated in Western Europe, and the Marshall Plan is partly to blame for that failure. For while the Marshall Plan has regenerated the productive capacity of Western Europe, it has left its economic, social and political structure by and large intact. The dangers to the stability and strength of Western Europe which have grown in the past from the defects of that structure have continued to grow because those defects were not repaired. The Marshall Plan, almost completely lost sight of those roots of instability and unrest, which antedated the emergency and were bound to operate after it was over.

In Asia, the choices for our foreign-aid policy have as a rule not been as simple as the European ones. In Europe, an emergency had to be met, and in meeting it we had to decide whether we wanted to deal also with the economic, social and political problems transcending it. We decided not to meet them, primarily because we did not dare intervene actively in the domestic affairs of other nations. So, as a matter of principle, we gave aid "without strings attached." In Asia, the choices of objectives and of policies have been more varied and their probable consequences more difficult to assess. Rarely, as in Korea and Viet-Nam, were we faced with an emergency which left us little leeway in the choice of objectives and policies. Generally, in view of our over-all objective of withholding the uncommitted nations of Asia and those committed to us from Communist domination, we have had a multitude of choices on different levels of decision.

Basing Policies on Local Realities

First of all, we have had a choice between action and non-action in terms of foreign aid. Some of the Asian nations might be so firmly committed to our side or else so determinedly uncommitted that their policy does not need to be supported by foreign aid. Other nations might have economic, social and political systems of such a nature as to make them impervious to influence by foreign aid. Others still might be susceptible to political or military measures rather than to those of foreign aid. Or foreign aid might create such social, economic and political instability as to make us prefer the preservation of the status quo to change.

Once we decided that none of these four reasons for non-action in terms of foreign aid applied, we had then to select from the many areas of action at our disposal: military, political, economic, technological and prestige. The choice of a particular sphere of action is dictated by the expectation that through it the desired objective is most easily attainable. However, the attainment of the objective depends also upon the willingness and ability of the foreign nation to put the necessary measures into

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effect; for it is, as we have seen, a peculiarity of foreign aid that it must become effective through the intermediary of a foreign agent.

The foreign government is the natural first choice. Yet it is quite possible that foreign aid, in order to be effective, requires a political change either in the composition of the government or in the over-all political structure. There must be a policy then on how to interfere with the political processes of the foreign country and how to choose between government and private auspices.

Losing Sight of Political Effects

Our policy of foreign aid to Asia shows hardly a trace of such thought processes. The four principles by which it is guided are, by contrast with the subtlety actually required, simplicity itself. First, it defines success and failure of a measure of foreign aid not in terms of its political objective but in its own technical terms; an economic measure, for instance, is judged not by its political consequences, but by its economic results. Second, the political objective of defense against Communism tends to become equated with military preparedness *per se;* in consequence, military rather than political objectives tend to provide the standard and goal for American policy. Third, as recipients of foreign aid we tend to select countries which are friendly to us, defining friendliness in military terms and, hence, attaching visible or invisible military strings to our aid. Fourth, we prefer to give aid to the government in power, thereby contributing toward keeping it in power regardless of whether or not an available political or private alternative would be preferable in view of our interests.

Thus our policy of foreign aid has virtually lost sight of the over-all objective of our Asian policy. Instead, it has tended to become either an auxiliary of military policy, performing technical functions for it, or else a self-sufficient technical operation, to be judged solely in terms of the technical rules proper to it, that is, whether it will aid in the improvement of port facilities here, the increase of the agricultural yield there, and the modernization of accounting procedures elsewhere. In consequence, its operations have, at best, largely become irrelevant to the purposes of our political policy.

For an act of foreign aid is a political act, regardless of whether we want it to be so or whether we are even aware of it. Insofar as our foreign aid is, or only appears to be, an auxiliary of our military policy, it partakes of necessity of the political liabilities of that policy, to which we have referred in a preceding article. As such, it raises the spectre of Western imperialism, of militarism and of the exploitation of the human and material resources of the recipient country for alien purposes, especially those of war. Far from creating goodwill for the United States, it becomes a potent weapon in the Communist arsenal.

We are giving military aid to the countries which we have selected not in view of our political and military interests, but in view of their willingness to accept it. It is not we who have selected our allies to serve our interests, it is they who have selected us to serve theirs as a supplier of goods and money.

Since our military aid has no rational political objective, it is invalid not only in political but also in military terms. We are training and equipping foreign armies with apparently no thought being given to the political purposes to which those armies might be put, to the political consequences our support for them might call forth, and to the military context within which these armies might have a chance to operate successfully.

Wherever foreign aid is a self-sufficient technical operation, it tends to strengthen the status quo, without regard for the effects which the strengthening of the status quo may have upon the political interests of the US. The increase in the productivity of a politically and socially unsound economic system is likely to accentuate unsolved social and political problems rather than bring them closer to solution. A team of efficiency experts and public accountants might well have improved the operations of the Al Capone gang; yet by doing so, it would have aggravated the social and political evils which the operations of that gang brought forth.

The Waste of Misplaced Assistance

However, the lack of an organic connection between foreign aid and a clearly defined, consistent political policy tends to defeat foreign aid even if it is narrowly defined as a self-sufficient technical operation. For the very possibility of successful foreign aid thus defined may well depend upon the existence of a political and social environment conducive to it. In the absence of such an environment and with the aiding nation being oblivious to it, foreign aid, perfectly rational in its own terms, becomes a waste of human and material resources. Thus we sent the complete modern equipment for a tuberculosis hospital to East Pakistan where it remains unused because the interest and skill to use it are not available. Thus we established in South Viet-Nam a school for radio repairmen without a sufficient number of radios available to be repaired. In some countries of Asia we have duplicated segments of the government bureaucracy with teams of experts which form a virtual shadow government; and so has the United Nations.

As a general phenomenon the wastefulness of our foreign-aid operations is intimately connected with the political aimlessness of our policy. That policy is lacking in the practical discipline which is the reflection, in the field of action, of the discipline of the intellect. When I am sure in the knowledge of what I seek to achieve and how to go about achieving it, that certain knowledge will give all my actions a common direction and all my plans a common standard for evaluation, and

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the smallest detail of my planning and action will be informed by it.

The absence of a political discipline which could give intellectual standards and political direction to our foreign-aid policy in Asia has harmed our interests in yet another way. We have mentioned before the problem of prestige in connection with foreign aid. This is the tendency toward what may be called "conspicuous industrialization," an industrialization spectacular for producing the symbols of industrial advancement rather than sound in the technical terms of economics. A policy of foreign aid which is technically rather than politically oriented must make it almost a point of professional honor to disparage considerations of prestige and press for compliance with the principles of sound economics. While we have sometimes yielded, haphazardly and ineffectually, to the former considerations, we have generally been too "honest," too much devoted to the standards of the economic engineer to sacrifice the principles of sound economics to political expediency.

By doing so, we have sacrificed political advantage. By insisting on sound economic grounds, on going slow with industrialization, we have earned the resentment of countries which want to go fast and who suspect our insistence to be inspired by competitive, if not monopolistic motives. By emphasizing aid rather than trade, an emphasis dubious from a strictly economic point of view, we wound the self-respect of the recipient nation, and by appearing to neglect its obvious short-range economic needs through our concern with long-range and less obvious benefits, we lay ourselves open to similar suspicions of selfish policies carried on under altruistic guise. By carrying on our policy of economic aid against the overpowering background of our military concerns, all our economic aid becomes suspect of being a mere auxiliary of our military policy.

Basic Difference of the Soviet Approach

Until the fall of 1955, the main immediate liabilities which the United States suffered from the immaturity of its foreign-aid policy in Asia were its futility and wastefulness; it was only long-range prognosis which suggested the possibility of political disaster. For having the field of foreign aid virtually to ourselves, we could afford failing in our foreign-aid policy without, in the short-run at least, losing the political battle for Asia. The entrance of the Soviet Union in the competition has changed all that.

We have it on very high authority that this is all to the good, that the Russians are imitating us, thus bearing witness to the success of our foreign-aid policy, and that it ought to be easy for us to beat them at that game. It would indeed be a comfort to believe that this were so and that the Russians were taking a leaf out of our own book, intending to play the game according to our own rules and trying to outspend us. What a triumph it would indeed be for American policy if we had persuaded the Soviet Union by our example that they can win the battle for Asia by being as futile, as wasteful and as politically unaware as we have been!

Unfortunately, this "authoritative" analysis bears no relation whatever to the actual facts. The Russian initiative owes nothing to our example, but everything to the awareness that the Cold War of position has changed to one of movement and maneuver, requiring new methods on all levels of policy. Everywhere in Asia and the Middle East the Soviet Union has completely, one might even say ruthlessly, subordinated foreign aid to the requirements of high political policy.

The Soviet Union does not ask what do these countries need in view of their economic and technical development? Rather, it asks what do they want and what should they have in view of the political objectives of the Soviet Union? Thus in Afghanistan and Egypt, in India and Burma, the Russians aid and trade oblivious of the rules of economics but fully aware of the rules of the political game.

To that aid the Russians attach no strings, military or other. More particularly, they promise and deliver arms without asking for what purpose they might be used. Nor do they try to reward their friends and punish those who refuse to exclude the enemies of the Soviet Union from their friendship. The difference between our dealings with India and the Russian treatment of Pakistan illuminates the basic difference in conception and method. We have been reluctant and grudging in giving aid to India because she has refused to become an ally of the United States. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has offered aid and trade to Pakistan, which as an ally of the United States is certainly more hostile to the Soviet Union than India is to the United States. Finally, the Soviet Union has everywhere available at least two levers for action: the established government and the Communist Party. It can use one or the other or both of them in concert or against each other.

Such are some of the methods of foreign aid against which the United States must contend. It can no more afford to imitate the Russian methods than the Russians are imitating ours. Yet it can and must bring the fullness of its human and material resources to bear upon problems which are as vital for the future of the United States and of the non-Communist world as they are difficult to grasp and solve.

This task we have hardly begun to tackle because the US has no more understood the political function of foreign aid than it has understood the political function of psychological warfare and military policy. This lack of understanding has indeed been the besetting sin of our foreign policy both in Asia and Europe. Of it and of the remedy for it, more will be said in a concluding article.

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The Superficial Aspect

Two Eisenhowers?

SENATOR CASE'S prediction that the Democrats will lose votes if they make a political issue of the President's health is interesting, but irrelevant. Political parties do not make the issues in any campaign; they merely seize upon the issues that seem to be of most interest to the people, and it is not humanly possible to prevent their doing that.

On their part the people are amply justified in taking an interest in anything whatsoever that is likely to have a profound effect upon the political history of the country. In a democracy they are more than justified, they are obligated to do so. The question then is not what the parties choose to do or to omit doing but, is the health of a candidate likely to have an important effect upon the course of events? We know that the health of a President is a matter affected with a public interest; we discovered that in 1919, when Woodrow Wilson was stricken and was not thereafter physically capable of carrying the full burden of the Presidency.

But we have had also at least one sharp lesson regarding the health of a candidate. It came in 1824 when the balloting gave Andrew Jackson 99 electoral votes, John Quincy Adams 85, William H. Crawford 41 and Henry Clay 37, throwing the election into the House of Representatives. Since the House, under the Constitution, must choose a President from the three leading candidates, Clay, being eliminated, threw his strength to Adams; and that his action profoundly affected history is not denied.

Clay was able to do this because in the midst of the campaign Crawford, up to that time a leading if not "the" leading candidate, had a stroke similar to Wilson's; but he made a fairly good recovery and, like Wilson and like almost any other able and ambitious man, he was unwilling to admit the seriousness of his disability. He refused to withdraw from the race and by staying in made it certain that no one would receive a majority of the electoral votes.

If he had withdrawn, his votes would almost certainly have been distributed between Jackson and Clay, for he drew no strength from Adams. If Jackson had received three-fourths of them he would have been elected; if he had received only half—and most historians think he would have been good for at least 25—he would have been so far ahead of Adams that it would have been virtually impossible for Clay to have made a deal. In any event, with Crawford out, Clay would have still been in the race in the House, and the deal might have been Clay for President and Adams for Secretary of State.

It is utterly fatuous, therefore, to say that if there is reason to suspect the physical ability of a candidate the voters should not take that fact into account. They certainly took it into account in the beginning of the campaign of 1932 when Roosevelt, crippled by polio in 1921, was nominated. But Roosevelt's tremendously vigorous campaign eliminated it before election day—helped, of course, by the fact that 11 years had passed since the first attack and the public's belief that a second attack of polio is unheard of.

This does not apply to a coronary occulsion. A second attack is so common that elaborate precautions must be taken to guard against it. One precaution is to restrain the patient from undue exertion, so Mr. Eisenhower cannot, in prudence, eliminate the issue of health as Roosevelt did, by making a tremendously vigorous campaign. He has already announced that his campaign will be a quiet one, which inevitably means that the issue will remain unless some other means of eliminating it is devised.

The sole method that gives much promise of accomplishing this would be to create a situation in which a second heart attack would definitely and certainly not disrupt the established policies of the government. This means that the candidate for Vice President must be, as far as his policies and political philosophy are concerned, a second Eisenhower.

DISCOVERING and nominating a second Eisenhower thus becomes the chief problem of Republican leadership —and what a problem it is needs no emphasis. The ebullient Mr. Nixon will not do. Apart from all else, the recent activities of the oil lobbyists, and the suspicion that the voters can say, like Sheba, "the half has not been told," revive memories that Mr. Nixon, as a Senator, got, not $2,500 but $18,000 from oil and real-estate interests. His nomination would not eliminate, but intensify public interest in the health of the President.

But if a real Eisenhower understudy were found in, say, Mr. Herter or someone of the same type, there would remain the problem of nominating him. Mr. Knowland and his friends have found it hard to take one Eisenhower. To expect them to stand for two is optimism of very high proof indeed. Yes, it is a pretty problem that the Republican leaders must solve; their home-work is heavy.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Political Sense of Ford Madox Ford

by E. V. Walter

ULTIMATELY, when critics write about Ford Madox Ford, they write about his technique, and since he is, if anything, a virtuoso of the well-made novel, it is appropriate that they insist on this side of his work. Still, in *Parade's End,* the Tietjens tetralogy (*Some Do Not . . .; No More Parades; A Man Could Stand Up—; The Last Post*), he is also a political novelist.

This aspect is obscured by some of his admirers who make a fastidious effort to preserve the concept of the well-made novel from political defilement.

Facile conclusions have been drawn from this position, leading to a Manichaean view of the novel that conceives form and life as somehow antithetical and also implies a denigration of the concept of politics. The conception is not to be taken lightly, for, as Lionel Trilling has warned, "Unless we insist that politics is imagination and mind, we will learn that imagination and mind are politics, and of a kind that we will not like."

The well-made novel and the political novel are not mutually exclusive genres, as some would have us believe. The vitality of the Tietjens cycle as a political novel is achieved by its formal excellence, and the politics of the tetralogy is an aspect as essential to an understanding of Ford's authorship as is his craft.

Throughout the tetralogy, Ford's art breathes life into the ancient political truth that the state is the soul writ large and the self is the republic in microcosm. History, in the Tietjens cycle, plays a dual role, providing an emotional milieu that infuses the characters with motives for their dramatic movement and serving as a backdrop against which their lives are acted out. The terrible irony of world politics contrasts the goals of Empire with the sufferings of the men in the line, Imperial destiny with stupid official behavior, and strategic logic with tactical exigency. The lives of the characters explore for us the relation between inner and outer chaos and show how the pathology of the self is conditioned by "the public events of a decade."

Christopher Tietjens, Ford's hero and the incarnation of the aristocratic ideal, encounters the effete institutions of post-Edwardian England, and that world, sick unto death, tries to destroy him. Hating him because he is a symbol of the very ideal they have betrayed, his own people, the recreant ruling class, are his fiercest harrower. He survives their onslaught, endures the First World War, and escapes underground, hinting that in another day aristocracy will rise again. On the one hand, through the mind of Tietjens we perceive the aristocratic ideal from the inside; on the other, we have an allegory of the disintegration of the English governing class.

IN THE aristocratic imagination, there are four royal roads to the sublime life: the saintly, the wise, the heroic and the bucolic. Spiritual archetypes, these patterns are not necessarily aristocratic—the saint may be beggar as well as pope; the sage, poor or rich; the hero, worker or knight; the tiller of soil, peasant or squire—but they are perennial forms in which the aristocratic ideal appears. Since Tietjens represents, to some degree, all four, his destiny corresponds to the fate of the ideal. He is saintly, but is persecuted for his sanctity; he is sagacious, but the war almost destroys his mind; he is heroic, but his military career turns into a fiasco and he is all but drummed out of the service; he returns to the soil, yet not to find some creative power but only to flee the world and get underground.

As Irving Howe has pointed out, the 19th-Century political novel ruminated over the latent chaos in institutional life and the menacing subversion or destruction of order which lurked beneath the smooth surface, whereas the 20th-Century political novel accepts the destruction of the old order as a *fait accompli.* In one way, Ford stands between the two, watching English society as it comes apart.

In Ford's earlier book, *The Good Soldier,* the narrator had confided that behind the mask of appearances, below the surface of conventions, there are "broken, tumultuous, agonized and unromantic lives, periods punctuated by screams, by imbecilities, by deaths, by agonies." Later, after his experience in the war, Ford was impelled to develop this vision as it is reflected in the collective life.

COLLECTIVE disorder brings chaos to all forms of private life, including the sexual life. The pathology of Duchemin, the mad clergyman whose demon makes him hurl Latin obscenities; Sylvia, whose sex hunger demands violence; Edith Ethel, whose polite adulteries disintegrate into hysteria; and the rumors that almost overwhelm Christopher are part of the syndrome. Christopher and Mark, whose monogamy is grounded on principle, have an immunity. Christopher's own passion for Valentine, hinting at an image of *l'amour courtois,* is saved by its being an anachronism.

Ford had given the key to the problem of sexual chaos in *The Good Soldier.* There the narrator had observed:

> If everything is so nebulous about a matter so elementary as the morals of sex, what is there to guide us in the more subtle morality of all other personal contracts, associations, and activities? Or are we meant to act on impulse alone? It is all a darkness.

But if Christopher and Mark Tietjens stand for monogamy, the controlling irony again appears: not conventional but ideal monogamy. For Mark lives with his mistress whom he will not marry (until he is on his deathbed), whereas Christopher is married to a woman with whom he will not sleep and attached to another who is a mistress in idea only (until after Armistice Day). Monogamy must be based on principle, and principles are "like a map"—they let you know where you are. Especially in a world where there will be no more parades, no more hope, no more glory, no more respect.

Refusing to separate politics and morality, Tietjens pronounces heavy judgment on his class. It is proper, he reflects, that one's individual feelings

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be sacrificed to the necessities of a collective entity, but not if that entity is to be betrayed from above. The war convinces him that he must make a radical break with the world. In the army, he hopes to be out of it before the end of the war, for then, perhaps, he would be in time for the last train to the old feudal heaven. No longer is there a tidy universe—you'd think God would have arranged the war so Yorkshiremen could go to heaven with the other North Country fellows instead of with Cockneys and Portuguese. In the old days, you used to fight beside men from your own hamlet, led by the parson's son, but now the Feudal Spirit is broken and dying is a lonely affair.

THE all but destructive effect of the war on the mind of Tietjens represents its effect on aristocracy and tradition itself. At one point, shell shock leaves him with a temporary memory loss, and he, who had once been an authority on almost everything and had despised books of reference, finds it necessary to read the entire Encyclopedia. His condition suggests Unamuno's formula: memory is to mind as tradition is to society. The dimension of time is highly significant for the Tietjens allegory, and Ford makes extensive use of the time-shift device to dramatize the interplay of time-memory-tradition.

The decline of the Tietjens family is the fate of the old governing class—the Good People who once ruled the nation and were responsible for its destiny. Their physical afflictions take on a larger meaning when one considers the ancient analogy between sickness in the body and injustice in the state. In the concluding book of the tetralogy, the abdication of the old ruling class is represented by the paralysis of Mark Tietjens. His immobility is the result of a stroke, but in his mind his silence is voluntary. Enraged by the behavior of his nation, he has vowed never to speak again. Thus, in the new world, aristocracy is impotent but secretly believes its condition self-imposed.

With the death of Mark, the passage of Groby to Christopher's papist son, the destruction of Groby Great Tree, and the escape of Christopher to the land near Bemerton parsonage, the ancient curse is lifted from the house of Tietjens and a new life begins for Christopher and Valentine. If a ruling class loses the capacity or the desire to rule, Tietjens had said, then "it should abdicate from its privileges and get underground." Frugality, temperance and industry regulate their lives as they live, without the convention of marriage, to remake "reality." Desiring to live hard, "even if it deprived them of the leisure in which to think high," and true to their anachronistic vision of the good life, they will be "jogging away to the end of time, leaving descendants to carry on the country without swank." Bemerton parsonage is the real England. Damn the Empire, it is England that matters, Tietjens had proclaimed, like a Cato denouncing orientalism, demanding a revival of the agrarian virtues and a return to the bucolic way of life.

The manner of his escape is a classical pattern of the aristocratic imagination. The pastoral idyll itself is protean and expressed by minds as diverse as Lao Tse, Theocritus, Rousseau, Jefferson and Tolstoy, but in its aristocratic form it is sometimes a reaction against chivalry that still retains the basic structure of the chivalric ideal. It is insufficient to tag this kind of agrarianism "romantic," for the chivalric romanticism of restraint is entirely different from its involution, the modern romanticism of impulse.

Even in times when the aristocratic view of life is the dominant image, the difference between ideal and practice cannot be concealed. Reality gives the lie to the illusions and pretensions of the chivalric view of society, and individual character determines the response to the shock of contradiction. Mockery is one way: in feudal times, the coarse satire of *les fabliaux* and the more polished raillery of a blasé court. Another way is the escape to innocence: to flee the hypocritical preciosity of aristocratic life, one could go to the soil and take refuge in uncorrupted nature. In the modern world, this escape is the way chosen by Tietjens. However, he must flee not only his own decadent circle, but the whole dying world.

IN his flight, he corresponds to the figure of the contrite noble, not aware of any personal guilt but of the *culpa* of his class. In many ways he is like the Slavophil *narodnik,* sensitive to social anxiety and apocalyptic dread, who proclaims that when the ruling class isolates itself and a gulf appears between it and the people, then society totters on the brink of the abyss. Although they are worlds apart in their traditions, there are nonetheless certain affinities between the impulse of Tietjens to return to the land and the desire of Count Tolstoy to live as a simple muzhik.

Feudalism survives underground with Tietjens, but in the world it is finished. After Armistice Day, the places of men are taken by strangers, their settlements occupied by "a vindictive and savage tribe." Since the moribund governing class had lost control of the state, a transfer of power was inevitable. Marie Léonie reads in the papers of "the deeds of assassins, highway robbers, of the subversive and the ignorant who everywhere seized the reins of power." Also, in the place of true nobility there are unscrupulous nouveaux. The world, without manners, would be a tiring place run by tiring people.

THE feudal mysteries of power are reduced by the official secrets of the bureaucracy. To Christopher's Tory mind, the old ruling class is responsible for the change. The indiscretions of the ruling class appear to him equivalent to scenes made before the servants. It follows that when the lower classes grow accustomed to such scenes, aristocracy loses its aura of sanctity and the arcanum of power is invaded. The new masters, it is implied, without Tory noblesse, would have little regard for the real welfare of the lower classes.

The lower classes are shadowy figures, and their indistinctness may be attributed as much to Ford as to the mind of Tietjens. Ford lacked the vision of Henry James, whose feeling for aristocracy did not obscure his penetration of souls, regardless of class. In his admiration of James, he freely admitted that although he had lived among agricultural workers, his knowledge of them did not measure up to that of the Old Man. Since he lacked the latter's perception of the emotional life of the poor, his lower classes remain lay figures.

They are all villeins: either faithful servants or "dirty . . . and with the mystified eyes of the subject races." In the army, faced with the breakdown of feudal categories, Tietjens had struggled with his image of the Other Ranks, worrying over the men in his command, reassuring himself that they were not just populations but "each man with a backbone, knees, breeches, a rifle, a

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ıome, passions, fornications, drunks, ›als, some scheme of the universe, corns, nherited diseases, a greengrocer's busi- ıess, a milk walk, a paper stall, brats, a lut of a wife." But in spite of his truggle to see them as real, they wear he faces of batmen and servants—un- lerground figures and completely mys- crious.

Some critics suggest that Tietjens rep- esents a defender of the lower classes. On the contrary, he is merely a defender ›f their limits. It is true that noblesse ›reeds a tender regard for the tiller of .oil, the shepherd, and the poor mer- chant, but only as long as their behavior conforms to the categories set up in the feudal mind. Behavior that exceeds these limits is interpreted as presump- tion, and, through it, villein becomes barbarian. In this mode of thought, the masses represent chaos—always a poten- tial menace. The restraint of feudal con- ventions, it is assumed, gives them hu- manity.

The aristocratic mind withdraws from the terror of a world of changing forms; however, on an island of its own it can survive. In self-imposed exile, surround- ed by faithful retainers (the "rocks" on which the "lighthouse" is built), Chris- topher and Valentine live their bu- colic idyll, insulated from the world in ruins.

The war, like the industrial fog that had long hung over the countryside, had been only a symptom of a deadlier dis- ease, and the perfidious nation merely a magnification of the untrue self. The premise of *Parade's End* is the same as that of *The Good Soldier*—that conven- tions are erected as restraints upon im- pulse—but it concludes that if the ruling class, the architect of morals, is itself not restrained, then it dies in the wreck- age, its own house about its ears.

Yet, hidden in Yorkshire under the debris, Tietjens and Valentine are a new Adam and Eve, and Tietjens discloses his intransigent conviction that after a long, dark night of the collective soul, aristocracy (meaning true nobility, which is based on virtue) may be re- born. It is said that during the Deluge it was a Yorkshireman who stood on Mount Ararat with water up to his chin and shouted to Noah: It's bound to clear up!

Where Society Suffocates Man

by Alfred E. Kuenzli

FIFTEEN years ago, in the conclusions to his *Escape from Freedom,* Erich Fromm wrote that "the only criter- on for the realization of freedom is whether or not the individual actively ›articipates in determining his life and hat of society, and this not only by the ormal act of voting but in his daily

'he Sane Society, by Erich Fromm (Rinehart; $5).

ctivity, in his work, and in his relation o others." He said that one of the onditions for the realization of demo- racy is "the elimination of the secret ule of those who, thought few in num- ›er, wield great economic power with- ›ut any responsibility to those whose ate depends on their decisions."

In this new volume, which caps his ›revious critique of authoritarian social ›tructures, Fromm rejects both the Soviet ›nd American systems because of their ailure to provide participation and be- cause, in his opinion, both systems tend to be psychologically destructive to the individual human personality. The au- thor points out that it was Marx who once defined socialism as a society in which "the full and free development of each individual becomes the ruling principle." Yet it is one of the tragedies of history, and perhaps the deep error of Stalinism, that this democratic ideal was sacrificed to the autocratic expedi- ent.

Marx is criticized for his "naïve op- timism" in supposing that emancipation from exploitation would automatically produce free, co-operative, and rational beings. Yet the author admires Marx enough to make use of the thesis that the mode of production tends to deter- mine the social relationships in a cul- ture, as in the case of the "marketing" personality which Fromm considers a typical American type. In this orienta- tion, a man experiences himself as a thing to be employed profitably and such human qualities as friendliness, courtesy, and kindness are transformed into commodities which are conducive to a higher price on the "personality mar- ket."

In his extended discussion of "Man in Capitalistic Society," Fromm develops his main thesis, that of alienation. This thesis of "meaninglessness" or lack of "personal authenticity" is, as the author recognizes, by no means new. Marx, Hegel, Kropotkin, Proudhon, Thoreau, Riesman, and many others have stressed the trend toward dehumanization in our Western culture. Fromm states that his purpose is "to apply the concept of alienation to various observable phenom- ena, and to establish the connection between the illness of alienation and the humanistic concept of human nature and mental health."

The solution to the problem of alien- ation lies, for Fromm, in the "Commu- nities of Work," about 100 of which exist in Europe today—some industrial, some agricultural. Communitarian So- cialists have, states Fromm, stressed the organization of work and social relations between men, not primarily the question of ownership.

Fromm's portrayal is neo-psycho- analytical; he both criticizes and ex- presses his indebtedness to Freud. It was Freud who first used the concept of "social neurosis" and who, in his *Civil- ization and Its Discontents*, made the point that human needs and social struc- tures can have conflicting demands. Fromm states at the outset that he is undertaking research into what Freud called "the pathology of civilized com- munities." Taking this frame of refer- ence, one defines psychological health not so much as an individual matter but instead as depending primarily on the structure of the person's society.

ONE of the main postulates of Fromm's system is that of a normative humanism. While it is true that man has almost infinite malleability, yet he cannot live, without reacting, under con- ditions which are contrary to the basic requirements for human growth and sanity. Man is not a blank sheet of paper on which culture writes its text. If he lives under adverse economic and political conditions, he must either de- teriorate and perish or else bring about conditions which are more in accordance with his requirements for development.

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Childhood In Comfort

by Grace H. Glueck

WHEN a hard-working novelist tires of inventing people, there is always the luxury of discovering himself. In *A House of Children,* Joyce Cary, who in a dozen-odd novels has indefatigably created a number of life-size characters and changed styles, accents, persons, and even tenses from book to book with astonishing dexterity, speaks about himself when young. He has produced a sensitive and tenderly humorous memoir that is alive with the spirit of childhood.

A House of Children, by Joyce Cary (Harper; $3.50).

Born into a leisurely, *fin de siècle* British milieu, Cary spent a boyhood crammed with picnics, sails, shoots, walks, cart-rides, sea-bathes, pranks, parties, doting relatives, rambling country houses, and devoted servants who loved children. He has unpretentiously evoked this life in a series of vignettes—almost like a childhood snapshot album—in which, as Evelyn Corner (for this memoir has been disguised as fiction, though it is too simple in structure, too limited in scope, to call a novel, as his publishers have done) he glides among his memories with easy grace, recounting incidents and recording impressions with a child's simplicity and directness, perceiving the whole through a fine screen of adult insight and reflection.

The children of Cary's book live during the summers at Dunamara, the house of Evelyn's Aunt Hersey on a shore of the largest lough in northern Ireland. From Anketel, the youngest, to Frances, the nubile eldest, they run in a sort of loosely organized pack whose tribal laws form an effective boundary between themselves and the surrounding adult nation. Fortunately, the adults in charge of motherless Evelyn, his brother and his cousins are a gay lot, who pursue diversions that keep them away from the children, although they manage, somehow, to materialize when needed for food, clothes, and emotional succor. The tribe is presided over by Delia, next eldest of Aunt Hersey's daughters who, about to be absorbed into the grown-up world herself, is having a last, passionate fling at being a child. There is even a summer tutor who is almost part of the pack—an arty, romantic young blade named Pinto who gives the children subversive ideas about education and the great world and who, dismissed for incompetence, emerges later as a sort of cultural director for the local haute monde, feared and respected for the intensity of his belief in Art.

In this permissive milieu, the children dream and grow, living without conscious aim "in a stream of childish sensation." Like children everywhere, the fall in love with each other, dig fo gold, explore caves, hatch scientifi projects, think guardedly about sex, giv swashbuckling plays, hunt rats with a guns, watch rain stream down the win dowpanes. They are happy withou realizing it—like Proust, Cary know that enjoyment of happiness occurs i expectation or memory; while the even occurs, we are too involved to savor i "I lived . . ." says Evelyn-Cary, "like a ant in the grass or some small bus creature under a hedge, scarcely ye aware of myself or my happiness. So I did not enjoy it then, and thank God for that sweet life as I have enjoyed it since."

How Resilient is Congress?

by Stephen K. Bailey

A FEW years ago, a cartoon appeared showing two Indians on a mesa watching a distant mushroom cloud. One Indian turned to the other and said, "I wish I'd said that."

Roland Young's new book is not a mushroom cloud, and this reviewer regretfully admits an absence of Indian ancestry. But the cartoon is still relevant. Any political scientist who has tried to catch the kaleidoscopic and evanescent character of Congressional behavior is aware of the maddening problems of portraiture. Mr. Young has sketched without caricature, and informed without pedantry.

Congressional Politics in the Second World War, by Roland Young (Columbia; $4.50).

Mr. Young's stunning description will satisfy neither those who see Congress as the sole bastion of freedom in our national life, nor those who see our national legislature, in Dewey Short's phrase, as a "supine, subservient, soporific, supercilious, pusillanimous body of nitwits."

Mr. Young traces Congressional action and reaction through the strains of World War II: the initial deferral to executive initiative; the recouping of Congressional power through investigations, statutes, and money bills; the unsteady balance between partisanship and patriotism; the pressure from constituents, presidents, and bureaucrats; the bewilderment of the average Congressman in the face of the cross purposes of wartime Washington; the difficulties of plotting a brave new world in the middle of a hurricane; the struggle with such vague clues to the public interest as "equality of sacrifice."

Mr. Young does not spare those Congressmen who were responsible for stupid or egregious statements or actions. But he points out that war places severe strain upon political institutions and that Congress not only survived the stresses and tensions of war but contributed mightily to the winning of it.

In his summary chapter, Mr. Young raises questions which far transcend the era which he has described with such skill. If wars come again they will not resemble World War II. If wars do not come, other kinds of crises unfortunately are not precluded. The real question Mr. Young leaves by implication is whether Congress is both resilient and responsible enough to maintain our constitutional equilibrium in the coming years. This question Mr. Young does not try to answer. But his faith and his doubts are clear. They are the faith and doubts which have been with us since 1787: the doubts that men are wise enough or good enough to govern themselves; the faith, tested by explosive experience, that they are.

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THEATRE

The Garden Where Nothing Will Grow

IN THE commercial theatre, first impressions are taken to be all that matters. The reviews that determine the fate of a show are written one hour after the first performance. The whole effort of producers and directors is to excite your interest in the first five seconds and then to prolong the excitement for two hours; after which the experience is over, and all that can be hoped for is that you will tell your friends I Was Excited. And so there are many shows which rouse one to tears and laughter as long as they are in progress and which, after they are done, leave no residue at all, not even a little discontent.

The Chalk Garden, by Enid Bagnold.

For me, *The Diary of Anne Frank* was almost like this. It was good while it lasted, but I have nothing to say about it because nothing of it stayed with me. It is one of those plays which depend on what the audience bring with them; the author doesn't give them anything to take home.

If first impressions are all, let the management of *The Chalk Garden* take note that I fled their show in dismay after one act. But what is more stimulating than irritation? I have since seen the play in its entirety at my own expense; and have read the script twice slowly through. I believe that, all in all, *The Chalk Garden* is the best new play (*Tiger at the Gates* not being new) of the season, a very brilliant piece of composition, one of the most skilfully built plays of this generation, with a good subject and an honorable theme.

Miss Madrigal, the protagonist, seemed guilty of the murder of her stepsister, even though she wasn't; the element of doubt saved her from the gallows, but not from jail. In presenting an episode of this lady's subsequent life, Miss Bagnold adroitly uses a double action. The outer action of her play consists of the progressive revelation, to the others on stage and to the audience out front, of Miss Madrigal's past; it is this action which gives the play its primary contact with the audience, for it has the interest of a murder mystery. The inner action is the story of a young girl (Laurel) whom Miss Madrigal saves from a fate similar to her own; it is on this action that the play's claim to meaning and distinction mainly rests. I state forthrightly that Miss Madrigal committed no murder, because this is what she herself definitely implies, and otherwise the story makes no sense. She tells how the case against her had plausibility, but not truth. She also intimates that she had been such a liar that when she eventually told the truth it wasn't believed. ("When she told the truth it didn't save her." "I learned in 9 days that innocence is not enough.") In effect, it seems, she had in her mendacity made herself out a murderer. The law, being concerned with justice and not with pity, with the weighing of statements and not the dispensing of charity, could only reach the negative conclusion. Having taken her punishment, and having been reborn through suffering, Miss Madrigal extends to a young girl in distress the pity and charity that had been withheld from herself. The distress is just such a self-destructive mendacity as her own. Laurel (whose governess she has been appointed) likes to think that she was raped at the age of twelve and that her mother is a sensualist. So she languishes in her grandmother's chalk garden, where nothing can grow, until Miss Madrigal does battle both with her neurosis and her grandmother; and wins. Laurel at last sees that truth is more interesting than fiction and goes off with her mother. Miss Madrigal stays with the grandmother, who must now face lovelessness and isolation.

A SOMBER play, then, with a moral more or less Pirandellian: the true meaning of life is to be sought, not in fact-finding, but in compassion and the domestic pieties. Yet, as also with Pirandello, if there is heartbreak underneath, there are paradoxes on the surface. And Miss Bagnold's paradoxes—that is, her comic images, tricks, and phrases—are so striking that for many they obscure the rest of the drama. *The Chalk Garden* is *prima facie* a sort of drawing-room play to end all drawing-room plays. To symbolize that fact, as it were, the old butler Mr. Pinkbell is dying all through and does die in the last scene; while the new butler belongs to the time when servants are recruited from "the sick, the mad, and those who can't take their places in the outside world." Mrs. St. Maugham, the grandmother, is the last lady: "I don't entertain any more. The fight's over. Even the table is laid with fragments of forgotten ritual"—for she doesn't know why she's ordered two wine glasses each or whether forks are to be placed outside spoons or vice versa. . . .

WHY is the show so hard to take? To begin with, for many people it isn't, or it wouldn't still be running on Broadway after five months. Its history on the road suggests, moreover, that it might not have succeeded unless it had been given just the treatment the director (Albert Marre) gave it. Yet even if Mr. Marre is to be given fullest credit for saving the occasion, I am personally still somewhat put off by the production because it stresses what is already too evident in the script: that Miss Bagnold is a "character," given to headlong movements and cock-eyed ejaculations. Hence, one doesn't take hold of the story, let alone the theme.

I walked out the first time because the performance was so full of effort and strain. Gladys Cooper (Mrs. St. Maugham) was hamming it up, and Siobhan McKenna (Miss Madrigal) would keep pointing her head at the balcony and booming. The performance I saw a couple of months later was a good deal better, though not without the same clumsiness and effortful drive. The vocal quirk must be one Miss McKenna always has trouble with, as it is present in her Juno on the new recording of O'Casey's play; yet my second visit made me see how much the show depends on her un-actressy beauty and strangely fine combination of sturdy and delicate elements. As the new butler Fritz Weaver shows as surprising a gift for the grotesque comic here as he did last year for the grotesque tragic when he played Flamineo in *The White Devil.* However, the imperfection of his Cockney accent disturbed me, and he followed his elders and non-betters in making his comic points too grandly by half.

The fact that the play seems obscure is due as much as anything to the casting of Betsy von Fürstenberg as Laurel

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and of Marian Seldes as her mother. Miss von Fürstenberg has a sexiness of presence to which I am as susceptible as anyone, but her lack of interest in a *role* is also considerable. The role of Laurel develops; Miss von Fürstenberg just comes and goes. The mother has been regarded as the off-horse of the family, "plain, shy, obstinate, silent . . . even your wedding dress you wore like wrapping paper"—none of which seems to apply, even inaccurately, to Marian Seldes; and so a connecting link in this carefully concatenated family scheme is missing.

Even for the script, and even now, my admiration has limits. The wit descends to mere paradox, the elegance to preciosity, the originality to eccentricity, the intelligence to exhibitionism. "For a phrase she would make capital of anything," as someone says of someone in the play. Does Enid Bagnold have what it would take—emotion, love, imagination, genius—to give her main conception the form that it deserves? Where Pirandello reinforces his paradoxes with Sicilian passion, and Giraudoux redeems his preciosity with a flood of Gallic melancholy, one half suspects that Miss Bagnold, while commending to others fertility and richer soil, is somehow stuck, finally, in her own garden of chalk.

ERIC BENTLEY

"You just put good, green, folding money in their lily-white hands and be goddamn sure they know why you put it there."

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TELEVISION

Tin Suits and Chromium Commercials

THE announcement that the Olivier production of *Richard III* was to be telecast was received with cheers by a great many people, especially by those of us who are endlessly seeking the middle way between commercial inanity and educational ineptitude. Reading the cast, which included just about every British star except Alec Guinness, and thinking back over Sir Laurence's earlier successes in filming Shakespeare's plays, we looked forward to a splendid afternoon's entertainment, pleasing to eye, ear, and intelligence. As it turned out, most of us were disappointed.

Before going on, let me say that I am speaking here as a critic of television, not of motion pictures or, Heaven forbid, of Elizabethan drama. Let me say, too, that I was impressed by individual scenes and delighted by individual performances. With these qualifications established, I repeat that *Richard III* fell far short of expectations, and not just *my* expectations but Olivier's as well

Much was made of the fact that the Sunday afternoon telecast brought the play to more people than had seen it in all the years since its original performance. Much could also be made of the fact that the vast majority of those Sunday afternoon viewers had enormous difficulty figuring out what it was all about. I base this statement not only on my own reaction, which may have been conditioned by a corrupting diet of commercial television, but also on the reactions of a number of acquaintances who spend their time teaching English literature and look on popular entertainment in general with proper scorn. If these eggheads, first folios firmly in hand, had difficulty identifying the players and following the action, it's hard to see how the *I Love Lucy* fans made any sense at all out of the goings-on. I'm willing to bet there were very few viewers who didn't find themselves wondering, at least once in a while, just who was who, and who was doing what to whom, and why, and where did Jane Shore come from anyway.

For this confusion and incoherence, television was certainly in part to blame. Once again the need for intimacy, which is demanded by the nature of the beast, was thoroughly apparent. The film, as Olivier said, "simply wasn't made for television." And the breaks for commercials, to which I thought I had long ago become hardened, were never more irritating. This was a great, big, tremendously expensive, three-hour affair, and the General Motors minds obviously decided that the commercials had to be great, big production numbers. As a result, the minutes ticked away and the coherence of the plot went glimmering while the pitchmen eased into their sel —or while Dave Garroway, perched or a stool, mouthed nonsensically about the "legend" of King Richard. "Some times," Sir Laurence later told the press "I wasn't sure whether we were watching a movie about automobiles or Shakespeare's play."

I DON'T know what effect the telecast of the movie will have on its success when it reaches American theaters. I certainly intend to see it—full size and in color—because I'm sure it's much better than it seemed on TV. (I also want to see Jane Shore again and get that row at Bosworth Field straight in my mind.) But I hope this telecast leads to some sober second thoughts on the part of those television people, and television fans, who have been rubbing their hands with glee over the ever-increasing flow of major movies to the TV networks. Some moving pictures work out beautifully on television (I watched the old Graham Greene-Carol Reed thriller, *The Fallen Idol,* recently and enjoyed it just as much as I had in a theatre years ago); but those that do are intimate films, with interior settings and small casts. Pictures that are "big" in a physical sense need far more elbow room than a living room can provide.

DAVID R. EBBITT

Notes on Contributors

E. V. WALTER is on the political science faculty at Ohio Wesleyan University. ALFRED E. KUENZLI is a psychologist at the New York State College for Teachers. GRACE H. GLUECK is a free-lance writer specializing in modern fiction. STEPHEN K. BAILEY is Director of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton.

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Correspondence

(*Continued from page 3*)

irst person. I shall be saddled for a lifeime now with an Indo-Chinese misress! But I would point out that Fower himself realises that the venom he xpresses at times towards Pyle's country s conditioned by the fact that Pyle has aken his girl. See page 184 and the paragraph that begins "I began almost unconsciously to run down everything hat was American." Oh, I see, this does nd with the sentence I was trying to ind.

GRAHAM GREENE

London, England

► Morgenthau on Asia

SIRS:

Hans Morgenthau in his article on our Asian policy (*NR*, March 12), makes, as he often does, some incisive observations, but his overall interpretation is almost as unrealistic as that found in the Pentagon document which he so relentlessly demolishes.

Communist doctrine aims at the radical abolishment of the poverty, diseases, starvation, human exploitation, injustice, and hopelessness which have been the lot of Asians for four thousand years. Such a doctrine transcends specific local grievances. Although it is unquestionable that the Communists invariably exploit the grievances to be found in a given locality, this is only done to soften up the enemy and is not Communism's main weapon. The basic appeal which Peiping's propaganda machine uses is that the Communist doctrine, particularly as revised by Mao Tze-tung and put into practice in China, is *the* solution for all Asian nations. If the Southeast Asians are impressed, it is not (contrary to Morgenthau's opinion) due to "the great tradition of Chinese culture" but to the fact that China under the Communists has made vigorous social and economic progress, shown impressive military strength, recovered its lost dignity, and has found enthusiasm and hope for the future. And all this because of her Communist techniques, programs, purposes, and ideals—in short, because of her Communist ideology.

The real threat of Communism in Asia lies in the fact that the Asian nations may be bedazzled into voluntarily choosing Communism, either by elections or by other forms of support of the Communist political or military nuclei. If most Asian peoples do this, then we have lost the "struggle for the minds of men," we have lost the ideological battle. To argue that the Communists rely solely on the exploitation of local grievances is to ignore this tremendous danger.

OLIVER LEE

University of Chicago

► A Liberal for Eisenhower

SIRS:

The letter, "A Liberal for Eisenhower" (*NR*, March 5) is one of the best things I've seen in *The New Republic* for a long time.

The Democratic Party has become increasingly reactionary in recent years, and only a service unthinking loyalty has prevented Democrats from realizing it. Democratic leaders apparently have assumed that, liberals having no other place to go, they would invariably wind up in Democratic voting columns. . . .

JEANNE RIHA

Los Angeles, Calif.

" . . . I plead guilty"

If the letter by "A Liberal for Eisenhower" is an example of "independent thinking," the independent thinker is in a bad way.

I will admit that Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace idea is wonderful. How much it helps our side remains to be seen. Does this Eisenhower liberal deny that the sub-summit meeting completely washed away the dubious results of the Geneva conference? Does he believe that the voters are as pro-Arab as Dulles on the Middle East situation, or that they are not distributed by the on-off-on secret tank shipment to Saudi Arabia? Does he believe that foreign policy can be entrusted to a brink-of-war Secretary of State? Does he deny that the free world has lost ground in India, Greece, the Middle East and other vital areas of the world, as attested by important political analysts? In fact, can he point to one concrete situation where we have gained ground on the Reds *anywhere?* Is he happy about this state of affairs to a degree that he will vote for Ike?

. . . What has Eisenhower done about the Till killing or the Lucy case? Nothing. . . . As for McCarthy, the Republicans allowed him to run free as long as he hit Democrats as traitors, but when he attacked a Republican Secretary of the Army, a Republican Secretary of State, and even Eisenhower then the GOP made a stand. But long before that Adlai Stevenson sailed into McCarthy with both fists flying in a magnificent speech. . . .

If the above makes me an "intolerant, doctrinaire, sloganmaker" I plead guilty. There is just one great reason Ike will get a big vote—the Great Papa image.

ALLEN KLEIN

Mount Vernon, N. Y.

► Graves and Greatness

SIRS:

Robert Graves' animadversions for Yeats, Eliot and Pound (*NR*, Feb. 27) are hardly new. . . .

[His] chief complaint seems to be that these poets have been canonized even before they are decently dead. They are already, horror of horrors, taught in the schools! It is hard to cast off the ancient prejudice that *Greatness* is unrecognizable until at least 100 years after a man is dead.

I think it is to the everlasting credit of this barbarous age that it should recognize its greatest poets. They most certainly *should* be taught in the schools. Where else would we find them? In the coffee houses? (Why not courses in Contemporary Poetry? Maybe even a little Robert Graves.). . . .

JEAN PILE

Minneapolis, Minn.

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

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